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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to illustrate the
components of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as
outlined by the Alliance for Progress and the 1984 National
Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America.
Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and
the success of its application during the Alliance for
Progress, does the theory of underdevelopment and violence
represent a viable foundation for United States foreign
policy?
The results of this study suggest that the theory of
underdevelopment and violence in its present form, does not
represent a viable foundation for United States foreign
policy in underdeveloped countries of the world.
The theory
consists of an unproven set of assumptions that do not
establish a solid foundation for foreign policy.
In
addition, the application of the theory during the Alliance
demonstrated numerous problems.
First, the theory is based
on U.S. middle class values and desires.
Its success is
dependent upon the acceptance of these values in societies
where middle class values are not the same.
Second,
business interests affect foreign policy and they do not
necessarily coincide with economic, political, and social
development policies.
And third, during the Alliance, the
theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived and
implemented without the participation of many traditional
foreign policy actors.
Once those traditional players were
called upon to implement the Alliance, they were able to
transform the program to suit their interests and concerns.
Due to the nature of the U.S. foreign policy process, it is
likely that the theory of underdevelopment and violence
would be subjected to the same pressures if it were to be
set in motion again.

v

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

Throughout much of the world, United States security
interests are bound to the well-being of friendly countries
Many of these countries are economically,

politically,

militarily strong and secure.

Thus, U.S.

interests for the

However,

in other parts of

most part seem relatively safe.
the world, U.S.
political,
countries.

and

interests appear threatened by the economic

and social crises present in friendly developing
For example,

in the Philippines, where U.S.

military forces at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval
Base help to maintain a deterrent to the growing Soviet
military presence in the Pacific, the fledgling government
of Corazon Aquino faces a persistent communist insurgency
from the New People's Army (NPA), a stagnating economy, and
dissident elements of the old Marcos regime, all of which
seem to threaten the U.S.
the challenge to U.S.

facilities.

In Central America,

interests are present as well.

The

devaluation of the Mexican peso and falling world market
prices for petroleum have helped spawn resentment and
dissatisfaction with Mexico's ruling Institutional
Revolutionary party

(PRI).

In Guatemala and El Salvador,

stagnating economies and dismal social and political
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conditions are accompanied by various intensities of
insurgent warfare.

The persistent question that foreign

policy makers face is how can the United States safeguard
its interests in developing countries which are experiencing
such problems?
Although the U.S. has striven to protect its interests
through the use of military force, economic assistance,
sanctions, and embargoes, support of friendly political
groups, and the marshalling of international condemnation or
support,

it is the policy of lending U.S. assistance,

specifically to improve a developing county's economic,
political, and social plight, that forms the topic of this
discussion.
Academic writings and debates of the late 1950s spawned
a theory which serves as the nucleus for the construction
and implementation of United States foreign policy in
underdeveloped nations of the world.
that economic, political,
instability, violence,

This theory assumes

and social underdevelopment cause

a potential for communist revolution,

and thus a threat to U.S. security interests.

Therefore,

this theory reasons, United States interests can be defended
successfully by overcoming the conditions of
underdevelopment through the extension of economic,
political,

and social assistance.

This guide for foreign policy was the centerpiece of a
U.S. sponsored hemisphere-wide initiative called the
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Alliance for Progress and recently endorsed by the 1984
National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America.
This thesis asks, based on an assessment of its accuracy and
validity and the success of its application during the
Alliance for Progress, whether this theory of
underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation
for United States foreign policy.
In order to answer this question the components of the
theory of underdevelopment and violence must be explored.
Chapter one of this thesis will examine the Alliance for
Progress and the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report
on Central America to uncover the concepts of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence.

Chapter two will seek to

establish the validity and accuracy of the theory and
chapter three will attempt to assess, with the aid of three
different perspectives, the success of its application
during the Alliance for Progress.
examination,

As a result of this

a judgement can be made in the fourth and

concluding chapter regarding the theory's viability as a
basis for United States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.

CHAPTER I

In 1961, President Kennedy announced the commencement
of a multi-million dollar program to assist Latin America
countries and christened it the Alliance for Progress.
Kennedy characterized its scope as similar to that which was
needed to rebuild the economies of Western Europe after
World War II."1
declaration,

More than twenty years after this

in 1984, the National Bipartisan Commission

Report on Central America— popularly referred to as the
Kissinger Commission— released its findings and
recommendations.

What these two seemingly unrelated events

have in common is the articulation of a theory which serves
as a method for understanding the relationship of conditions
and events in underdeveloped countries— Latin America
specifically— and as a focal point for the conception and
implementation of United States foreign policy.

This theory

proposes that economic, political, and social
underdevelopment cause violence,

instability, and communist

encroachment.
This chapter examines the Alliance for Progress and the
National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America,
not only to illustrate their similarities, but also to
5

6

illuminate the components and concepts of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence.

The theory is based on four

assumptions which are specified in official documents and
statements from the period of the Alliance for Progress and
in the findings and recommendations of the 1984 National
Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. Examining
the foreign policy record during the Alliance and the
findings and recommendations of the Commission will
illuminate the similarities between the Alliance and the
Commission, as well as the components of the theory of

-

underdevelopment and violence.
The first assumption indicates that economic,
political, and social underdevelopment lead
instability.

to violence and

It was believed that frustration over these

conditions caused people to react violently.

The second

assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause
the root conditions, economic, political, and social
underdevelopment, to worsen.

This interrelationship can be

characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster
increased underdevelopment.

The third assumption theorizes

that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence,
and instability encourage
revolution.

communist subversion and

Finally, the fourth assumption argues that

violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be
stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social
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development.

However, because these three areas of

underdevelopment appear interdependent,

it is reasoned that

improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will
not necessarily halt violence,
intrusion.

instability, or communist

As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the

programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the
Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political,
and social development programs to overcome violence,
instability,

and communist encroachment.

Before examining the assumptions underlying the theory
of underdevelopment and violence,
economic, political,

it is necessary to define

and social underdevelopment.

The

search for the meaning of these terms exposes the use of a
combination of examples to form definitions for economic,
political, and social underdevelopment.

In effect, the

Commission Report and policymakers during the Alliance
attached several, yet similar, meanings to each area of
underdevelopment.

For example, economic underdevelopment,

often regarded as economic recession, was also interpreted
to include high unemployment, decreasing or low gross
national product
national debt.

(GNP), a high trade deficit, or a straining
Political underdevelopment was defined as

inadequate governmental services, but also the absence of
democratic institutions and processes.

From the viewpoint

of Alliance policymakers and Commission members, political
underdevelopment constituted lack of free elections,
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effective public forums and processes by which citizens can
express opinions freely and influence public policy.
Finally, the definition of social underdevelopment includes
inequitable income, tax, and land distribution, poverty,
malnutrition,

and inequitable access to education, housing,

water, and medical facilities.
underdevelopment,

Like economic and political

social underdevelopment was characterized

in a number of ways.
In order to comprehend the theory of underdevelopment
and violence it is necessary to understand how policymakers
during the Alliance and the Commission members viewed the
conditions in Latin America.

Both were certain that Latin

America exhibited symptoms of underdevelopment— poverty,
frustrated expectations,

social and political injustice,

economic recession to name a few.

and

Compounding these

maladies were uncontrolled population growth and
urbanization which, according to the Commission Report,
"magnified the problems of inequitable distribution of
national income and overwhelmed the limited resources that
governments were prepared to devote to social services."2
Borrowing statistics provided by the Economic Commission for
Latin America

(ECLA), the Commission report estimated that

of the 23 million inhabitants of Central America,

14 million

could be classified poor and from that number one-third
lacked a nutritionally adequate diet.3
In 1961, the year in which the Alliance for Progress

9
was launched,

President Kennedy's delegates to the Inter-

American Economic and Social Council meeting at Punta del
Este, Uruguay,

recognized Latin America's economic,

political, and social underdevelopment.

Their findings

detailed deficiencies in housing, water, and medical
facilities,

substandard working conditions and low wages,

the need for agrarian and tax reform,

increased literacy,

improvement of the balance of trade, the stimulation of
private investment and enterprise, and the lack of
democratic institutions and processes.4

According to the

Commission and policymakers during the Alliance, these
conditions provided the impetus for violence and
instability.
The first assumption of the theory of underdevelopment
and violence indicates that economic, political,

and social

underdevelopment produce violence and instability.

The

Commission found that those nations in Latin America who
responded to this threat with increased economic, political,
and social development "have been marked by a stability
astonishing in light of the misery which still afflicts the
hemisphere."5

Nevertheless,

in sounding a warning to those

nations failing to come to grips with underdevelopment,
Commission member Edward Marasciulo of the Pan American
Development Foundation,

indicated that they would continue

to face violence and political instability.6

In more

menacing terms, the Commission compared the human need of
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Latin Americans to "tinder waiting to be ignited" into a
conflagration that could threaten the entire hemisphere.7
Utilizing the same assumption during the Alliance,
policymakers were convinced that if Latin American
governments were to be spared revolution, economic,
political, and social progress commensurate to the
aspirations of their people must be undertaken.8

According

to Wymberly Coerr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs in 1961, unless hope could be
given to the masses of Latin America, mounting frustration
and unrest caused by economic, political, and social
underdevelopment would lead to further violence and
destruction.

Based on an analysis of the type of violence

and instability plaguing Latin America, Coerr insisted that
continued economic, political,

and social underdevelopment

would cause many Latin Americans to seek relief through
radical transformation of their economic, political,
social structures.9

and

Equally vehement about the prospects

for escalating violence was Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas Mann, who warned that "support of the status quo will
only invite more violent and destructive change."10
One example of the problems caused by underdevelopment
was the issue of land reform in Latin America.
During the Alliance, the land distribution problem in Latin
America provided policymakers with clear evidence that
social underdevelopment— specifically the need for land
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reform— was a major contributor to the atmosphere of
violence and instability.

In the predominantly agricultural

countries of Latin America, ownership of land reflects
personal wealth as well as political and social status.
a result,

As

Latin American countries were commonly

characterized by a few of the nation's elite owning most of
the arable land while the majority of the poor scratched out
an existence on meager plots.

Lester D. Mallory, Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, addressed
this dilemma of the landless masses when he stated:
Picture the social and political effects, the
political dynamite, of having hundreds of
thousands of tiny exhausted [land] holdings
side by side with tremendous estates that, as
often as not, are under-cultivated and managed
for absentee landlords.11
The Commission report and policymakers during the
Alliance theorized that economic, political,

and social

underdevelopment caused violence and instability.

The

second assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and
violence demonstrates that violence and instability cause
the root conditions, economic, political, and social
underdevelopment,

to worsen.

This interrelationship can be

characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment
leads to violence and instability which,

in turn, fosters

increased underdevelopment.
Experience with the Alliance illustrated that a leading
deterrent to the success of any assistance program would be
the instability and violence that assistance programs were
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initially conceived to battle.

Undoubtedly, equitable

distribution of land, construction of schools, or improved
medical care, all equally important policy goals in the
fight for social development, could not take place in the
midst of a revolution, and unquestionably, that is exactly
where the development programs were needed the most.

Both

the Alliance policymakers and members of the Commission
realized that a cyclical process takes place where
instability and violence,

initially provoked by

underdevelopment, would continue to perpetuate the status
quo and thwart development.

This phenomenon is identified

by policymakers during the Alliance and by members of the
Commission— especially in the case of private U.S.
investments.
The Alliance for Progress and the Commission report
relied on private investment as a key to alleviating a
myriad of development problems.

In fact,

investment and

loans from private businesses and lending institutions
represented a sizable portion of development assistance
during the Alliance and for the programs envisioned by the
Commission.

During the Alliance,

David E. Bell,

Administrator for the Agency for International Development,
asserted that applying private investment could lead to the
"amelioration of the region's most basic problems."12
However,

like other aspects of development aid, violence and

instability tended to drive away private investors before
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they were able to extend assistance.
Experience during the Alliance's first year taught
Peter R Nehemkis, Washington Counsel for the Whirlpool
Corporation, that the threat of revolution in Latin America
had disheartened even the most speculative investor.

As

early as 1962, Nehemkis concluded that the political
environment in Latin America proved inhospitable for private
U.S.

investors.13
Reporting similar experiences, the Commission estimated

that before 1984, regional tension and political unrest had
resulted in a 3 billion dollar capital flight from Central
America.14

In the face of this deteriorating investment

climate, the Commission's primary objective prior to
instituting development plans required cessation to violence
and civil strife.

According to the Commission,

"no need is

more basic for the success of economic, political, and
social progress, than the elimination of the fear of
brutality inflicted by arbitrary authority and terrorism,
and the establishment peace."15
The Commission report and the policymakers during the
Alliance recognized that the impediments to private
investment resulted from the cyclical nature of
underdevelopment and violence, which hindered providing
assistance.

However, the conditions in Latin America which

contributed to the escalation of violence and made the
commitment of assistance more difficult served as a catalyst
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for communist subversion and revolution.
The third assumption of the theory of underdevelopment
and violence illustrates that the degenerating cycle of
underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourages
communist subversion and revolution.

The theory proposes

the stimulus for the spread of communism in Latin America is
underdevelopment.

It was believed by policymakers during

the Alliance and by members of the Commission that to blame
ferment and distress in Latin America merely on communism
was incorrect.

Communism is a result, not a cause,

it acts

to "exploit weakness in the political, economic, and social
fabric of Central America."16

And, as a result of this

frailty, according to Commission member Carl Gershman,
Central America presents an inviting target for communist
insurgency.17
Similarly,

in 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American Affairs, R. R. Rubottum,

suspected that

dissatisfaction with existing conditions and a yearning for
change bred frictions and frustrations which served only to
make Latin American societies more susceptible to communist
influences.18

Confirming this view before a 1963

Congressional Committee on communist subversion in Latin
America,

Lt. General Joseph F. Carol, Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency, pointed out that social
inequalities and economic stagnation proved ideal conditions
in which communist subversion could flourish.19
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What appeared to enhance the Marxist revolutionaries'
appeal to many Latin Americans, according to the Commission
report, was the belief that communists represented society's
only vehicle for economic, political, and social reform.20
During the Alliance, this conviction was equally
popular.

Lester Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for Inter-American Affairs during the Alliance,

found

that land inequality in the rural territories of Latin
America provided the communists with a powerful political
tool.

By proposing expropriation and redistribution of

land, the communists were able to transform these areas into
bastions of popular support.21

While in the urban areas, by

speaking out against social inequalities, communists attempt
to seduce the population into viewing them as the true
champions of democracy.22

But perhaps even more threatening

than the communists' appeal to the disillusioned is
their political and military affiliation with communist
countries.
Policymakers during the Alliance considered the Soviet
Union the primary sponsor of communist revolutionaries in
Latin America.
provided arms,

Relying on proxies such as Cuba, the Soviets
indoctrination, training, and support to

those who were willing to foment revolution.23

Not only was

Cuba judged to be the platform from which a communist
infiltration and attack would be launched, but also as the
central location from which the final drive to bring Latin
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America into the communist world would occur.24
Similarly, the Commission identified Cuba as the center
for supervision and control of training camps and
indoctrination schools, where trainees would receive up to
six months of instruction in guerrilla warfare, strategy,
weapons, propaganda, and agitation.25

As a result, the

Commission characterized Cuba as "the country best prepared
and most eager to exploit the intensifying crisis in Central
Am e r i c a ."26
With the fall of Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza
in 1979, and the Sandinista takeover and subsequent
alignment with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua had become,

in

the eyes of the Commission, the primary threat to Central
America.

Characterized as a "mainland platform" for

communist subversion, Nicaragua was considered a "crucial
steppingstone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed
struggle in Central America."27

According to Commission

member, Ambassador William H Luers:
The potential for the consolidation of a
Sandinista Marxist-Leninist government, allied
with the Soviet Union and Cuba and committed to
the export of revolution across its land
boarder, contribute significantly to the
region's disorder."28
A huge military buildup, coupled with an apparent intention
to use it to promote revolution in neighboring countries,
indicated to the Commission that Nicaragua's commitment to
the cause of armed struggle in the region would not
diminish.29
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Motivated by this threat to hemispheric security, both
the Commission and policymakers during the Alliance for
Progress foresaw an assistance plan designed to attack the
foundations of instability, violence, and communist
encroachment.

The fourth assumption of the theory of

underdevelopment and violence indicates that violence,
instability,

and communist encroachment can be stopped by

bringing about economic, political, and social development.
However, because economic, political, and social
underdevelopment appear interdependent,

it is reasoned that

improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will
not necessarily halt violence,
intrusion.

instability, or communist

As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the

programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the
Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political,
and social development programs to overcome violence,
instability,

and communist encroachment.

The Commission's findings and recommendations and the
development programs initiated by the Alliance for Progress
can be characterized as a blueprint for the long-term
restructuring of Latin American societies based on the
theory of underdevelopment and violence.
Doherty,

William C.

Commission member and representative of the

American Institute for Free Labor Development, echoed the
Commission's hope for applying United States resources to
promote economic development and advance democratic and
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social reforms when he said:
The required political, economic, and social
changes imply a long-term commitment from the
United States.
What is being suggested here is
nothing short of a peaceful long-term
democratic revolution— the changing of
political systems and overcoming social
injustice that have plagued the masses of
Central America for centuries.30
Similarly, the necessity of guiding the evolution of
Latin American societies was met with the same enthusiasm
during the Alliance.

Reflecting these views during

Congressional hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964, Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas
Mann, reiterated that the Alliance for Progress
. . . serves the security interests of the
United States by supplementing the efforts of
American Republics to build viable, expanding
economies that are better able: To provide the
jobs, food, education, and other necessities
required for their fast growing populations; To
promote the growth of democratic institutions;
To support the desires of their peoples for
political and economic freedom; . . .31
To combat the spread of violence,
communism,

instability,

and

the theory of underdevelopment and violence

proposes attacking the very foundation upon which these
problems take root.

Once economic, political, and social

development takes hold, frustration and violence, which
germinate the seeds of communist subversion, are eliminated.
However,

arguing that the crisis of underdevelopment cannot

be considered in just economic or political terms, the
Commission pointed out that without improvement in all three
areas of underdevelopment a viable long-term process of
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development cannot take place. Accordingly:
The requirements for the development of
Central America are a seamless web.
The
actions we recommend represent an effort to
address this complex interrelationship in its
totality not just its parts.32
To illustrate its point, the Commission noted that in
spite of impressive economic advances in Latin America
during a period in which economic issues and programs were
emphasized,

"the fruits of [this] expansion were distributed

in a flagrantly inequitable manner."33

For example, Central

America experienced an average annual increase in GNP of 2.5
percent during the late 1960s, nevertheless, the residual
political and social underdevelopment continued to foster an
atmosphere of violence and instability.

Consequently, the

Commission concluded that "unless economic recovery is
accompanied by social and political reform, additional
financial support will ultimately be wasted."34
Kennedy administration officials also recognized the
interdependence of economic, political,
underdevelopment.

and social

Assailing just social or economic

problems seemed wasteful when achievements such as an
increase in GNP could not restrain continuing frustration
and violence sparked by stagnant or worsening political and
social conditions.

This interdependence of conditions

appeared in the maldistribution of land in Latin America.
According to the Congressional testimony of Raymond J. Penn,
professor at the University of Wisconsin:
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Land ownership in Latin America is more than
just the control and ownership of the land
resource.
It is the web on which the existing
economic, social, and political structure
rests.35
Land ownership equates to status in one's community,

freedom

to act and speak freely, an opportunity to education,

and

ultimately the right to share in the control of the
government.

Therefore,

it seemed obvious that attacking

just economic, political, or social conditions alone would
not solve the current dilemma.
Kennedy,

According to President

in order for the Alliance to succeed, political

freedom must accompany material and social p r o g r e s s . 3^

The

success of applying the theory of underdevelopment and
violence to the crisis in Latin America rested upon the
precept that "social and political progress is not a
substitute for economic progress but an essential condition
of it."37
The programs envisioned by the Commission report not
only parallel those of the Alliance for Progress, but also
serve as evidence for the assumption that violence,
instability,

and communist aggression can be combatted with

development programs.

A review of these recommendations

will help to illustrate this assumption.
The short-term plans recommended by the Commission
concentrate on: First, adopting and promoting a Central
American Common Market; Second,
economic assistance

increasing U.S. bilateral

($400 million)

to create jobs and

support balance of trade deficits? Third, aid for labor
intensive projects such as housing; Fourth, trade credit
guarantees; Fifth, refinancing trade deficits? And sixth,
supporting a Central American Bank for Economic Integration
(CABEI).

As long-term development policies, the Commission

proposed instituting a $24 billion dollar aid package made
up of public and private sector grants, loans, and
investments, creation of a Central America Development
Organization

(CADO) whose Central American staff would

review and recommend aid plans, and support of the Caribbean
Basin Initiative which would establish duty-free entry for
Central American goods into the U.S. and between Central
American nations.

In the realm of political development,

the Commission envisioned grants,

loans, and investments for

democratic institutions and leadership training.

Financial

assistance would be used to encourage grass-root political
participation through neighborhood groups and regional
cooperatives.

Finally, social development schemes proposed

by the Commission included food aid, expanded literacy
programs through the Peace Corps,
U.S. colleges,

10,000 scholarships to

family planning programs,

and technical

assistance for health care, disease control, and housing
projects.
violence,

According to the theory of underdevelopment and
the introduction and success of these programs

will lead to economic, political,

and social improvements

which will cause a reduction in violence,

instability,

and
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communist encroachment.
In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and
violence can be summarized as four assumptions outlined in
the official documents and statements of the period during
the Alliance for Progress and by the findings and
recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission Report
on Central America.

The first assumption indicates that

economic, political, and social underdevelopment lead
violence and instability.

to

It was believed that frustration

over these conditions caused people to react violently.

The

second assumption illustrates that violence and instability
cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social
underdevelopment, to worsen.

This interrelationship can be

characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster
increased underdevelopment.

The third assumption theorizes

that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence,
and instability encourage
revolution.
violence,

communist subversion and

Finally, the fourth assumption argues that

instability, and communist encroachment can be

stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social
development.

However, because these three areas of

underdevelopment appear to be closely interdependent,
reasoned that improvements in one or two areas of
underdevelopment will not necessarily halt violence,
instability,

or communist intrusion.

As a result, the

it is
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theory, as evidenced by the programs of the Alliance and the
recommendations of the Commission, places equal reliance on
economic, political,
overcome violence,

and social development programs to

instability, and communist encroachment.

The enormity of the project proposed by the
Commission and undertaken during the Alliance presents
numerous opportunities to discuss the practical application
of each measure.

However, the immediate question concerns

the validity and accuracy of the theory of underdevelopment
and violence.

Does this theory represent a realistic view

of the causes of instability and violence?

With this

question in mind, the following chapter will examine a body
of literature known as cross-national causal analysis.
result of this review, we may be equipped to judge the
theoretical value of the theory of underdevelopment and
violence better.

As a

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
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CHAPTER II

The theory of underdevelopment and violence proposes
that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause
violence,

instability, and communist penetration.

However,

can it be stated with certainty that economic, political,
and social underdevelopment cause violence,
and communist encroachment?

instability,

Are all three conditions of

underdevelopment equally important or does economic
underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability?
Finally, do the relationships proposed by the theory of
underdevelopment and violence provide the foundation for
clearly defined policies with specific objectives?

With

these questions in mind, this chapter will survey a body of
literature dealing with cross-national causal analysis and
seek to establish the validity and accuracy of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence.
Three articles on cross-national causal analysis, the
first by William H. Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, the second
by Peter and Anne Schneider, and the third by Ted Gurr,
the basis of this investigation.

form

By quantifying and

qualifying the indicators of underdevelopment these authors
have attempted to establish statistical relationships
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between various aspects of economic, political, and social
underdevelopment and violence.
The first study,

"Patterns of Political Violence In

Comparative Historical Perspective," by William Flannigan
and Edwin Fogelman, examines the proposition that domestic
political violence is the result of a country's economic and
democratic underdevelopment.

In other words, political

violence is more likely to occur in countries characterized
by low levels of economic and democratic development and
countries with developed economies and sturdy democratic
institutions are likely to be relatively violence free.

It

is essential to point out that these studies are not
concerned with criminal violence such as robbery or murder,
but with political violence directed at political
institutions and policies.

The domestic political violence

index used by Flannigan and Fogelman is characteristic of
this genre of comparative study.
includes political assassinations,

The authors' index
riots, coups d' etats,

rebellions, and civil wars.
The first proposition to be tested states that violence
is directly linked to a country's level of economic
development.

As economic development increases over time,

political violence will decrease in frequency and magnitude.
Conversely, as economic underdevelopment increases over
time, political violence will increase in frequency and
magnitude.

The level of economic development (the dependent
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variable)

of each country is categorized in one of four

patterns.
Pattern One
Continuous low level of development.
More than
60 percent of the work force engaged in
agriculture.
Pattern Two
More than 60 percent of the work force engaged
in agriculture by 1900 and more than 35 percent
of the work force engaged in agriculture by
1960.
Pattern Three
Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged
in agriculture by 1900 and less than 35 percent
of the work force engaged in agriculture by
1960.
Pattern Four
Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged
in agriculture by 1860 and less than 25 percent
of the work force engaged in agriculture by
1960.1
Based on the statistical relationships that emerged,
the authors asserted that "the most violent countries tend
to be those at the lowest levels of economic development,
with a decreasing incidence of domestic violence as we move
from pattern one, two, three, and four."2

In fact, such a

"direct and consistent" association exists between the
incidence of political violence and patterns of economic
development,

the authors claim:

The incidence of domestic political violence
during the 2 0th century in countries which have
begun their economic development in this
century is not unlike the incidence of violence
in countries which are now highly developed but
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were themselves in the process of development
in the 19th century.3
In order to test their second proposition, which
focuses on democracy and violence, the authors constructed
an eight point index of democracy based on forms of
selection of chief executive, political competition, extent
of suffrage,

and degree of political suppression.

Stated

simply, the authors propose that violence is more likely to
occur in countries ranked low on democracy and less likely
in those ranked high.

Although their conclusions indicated

that democratic countries experienced relatively low levels
of political violence, these low levels were more closely
associated with steady economic growth.4

Therefore, because

economic development exhibited a stronger statistical
relationship to violence the authors conclude that "the
critical factor in explaining the relative absence or
abundance of violence is the pattern of economic development
rather than the type of regime."5
In another examination of internal political violence,
Peter and Anne Schneider,

in their work,

"Political

Institutions and Comparative Violence," compare violence to
social mobilization,

economic development,

of political institutions.

and the strength

Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman,

the Schneiders argue that economic development alone has no
direct impact upon the maintenance of political order.
"Rather, according to the data presented, political violence
is most likely to occur when the development of strong
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political institutions lags behind the process of social
mobilization."6
Social mobilization is the process in which old social,
economic,

and psychological commitments are replaced be new

patterns of socialization and behavior.

Mobilization is

assumed to increase the overall quantity of political
demands.

A transformation from a rural to a predominantly

urban society and from an agricultural to an industrial
society characterize the Schneiders' definition of
mobilization as well as another author's definition of
modernization.

For example, Karl W. Deutsch believed

mobilization occurred during modernization,

i.e., where

advanced non-traditional practices in culture, technology,
and economic life are introduced and accepted on a
considerable scale.7

According to the Schneiders,

improved

economic conditions and strong political institutions
primarily ease tensions among people by satisfying new
demands created by mobilization.

Drawing on the work of

Samuel P. Huntington, the Schneiders measure the strength of
political institutions (institutionalization) based on
adaptability

(age of the nation's constitution and major

political parties), complexity (expenditure of the central
and local governments social welfare services)) coherence
(percentage of the cabinet positions held by the majority
party and the total number of different parties represented
in the cabinet), and legitimacy (a value judgement based on
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the number of parties opposed to the structure of the
political system).8

Therefore, the Schneiders argue that

during economic hard times, social disorder and violence
usually result from the inability of the political system to
meet the new demands created by mobilization.9
Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman, the Schneiders regard
economic development,

as well as institutionalization,

as an

intervening variable which interacts with the mobilization
process.

Taken individually,

development,

social mobilization,

economic

and institutionalization do not reveal an

important relationship to violence.

However, the results

show that when countries experience low levels of economic
development in tandem with a high rate of social
mobilization, which in turn exceeds the ability of the
regime's political institutions to cope with the increased
demands, violence usually follows.10
A third study, by Ted Gurr, entitled,

"A Causal Model

of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,'*
examines relative deprivation as a cause of political
violence.

According to Gurr:

Relative deprivation is the basic precondition
for civil strife of any kind, and that the more
widespread and intense deprivation is among
members of a population, the greater is the
magnitude of strife in one form or another.11
Deprivation is the discrepancy between value expectations
(the goods and conditions of the life to which people
believe they are justifiably entitled), and value
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capabilities

(the amount of those goods and conditions that

they think they are able to g e t ) .

The determinants of

deprivation include sharp increases in peoples' expectations
resulting from short-term trends in inflation and domestic
production and persisting inequalities marked by economic
and political discrimination, political separatism,
dependence on foreign capital, religious cleavages, and
finally,

lack of educational opportunity.12

What Gurr's

results indicate is that strife varies directly in magnitude
and intensity to relative deprivation.13
The common theme among the three studies is that
violence results from dissatisfaction (economic, political,
social, or a combination)

among people.

The difference

among the authors is how to measure this dissatisfaction and
which component of dissatisfaction is most conducive to
violence.

These three works represent only a few of the

efforts to uncover a causal relationship between violence
and various societal conditions.

In his book, Mass

Political Violence. Douglas A. Hibbs notes that the
predominant view concerning the causes of violence is:
The process of rapid urbanization in general
makes for social instability, and that recent
migrants caught up in this process are
especially likely to engage in political
violence.14
A sampling of other works illustrates a number of
similar opinions.

William Kornhauser,

in his book, The

Politics of Mass Society, found that the social disruption
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that accompanies rapid urbanization and industrialization
"is destabilizing because it uproots and atomizes large
numbers of people".15

Another author, Pitirim A. Sorokin,

argues that internal disturbances increase during periods of
rapid cultural transformation.16

And, Mancur Olson

maintains that economic downswings,

and even upswings,

produce severe social instability, conflict, and potential
for revolution.17
One problem confronting studies of this nature is
quantifying political violence.

As Ted Gurr pointed out,

"there are numerous problems associated with defining
political violence and the relative scales used to measure
it."18

For example, difficulties result from

differentiating between small and large scale civil war or
organized and unorganized terrorism.

Relying on the

frequency of violent acts may distort the measure of
violence for countries with small and extremely active
terrorist groups.

Also, qualifying the magnitude of

violence may result in a biased measure of one particularly
violent and isolated period.
Douglas Hibbs believes that the qualification of
violence must meet three criteria.
system in character
system).

Second,

First,

it must be anti

(being at odds with the political

it must have political significance

(pose

a threat or severe inconvenience to the normal operation of
the political e lite).

Third,

it must be collective "mass"
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activity in which murder, armed robbery or similar criminal
acts are not counted.19
Hibbs' major complaint concerning the literature in
this field is:
Investigations that have dealt explicitly with
causal relationships have often done so badly.
Some have employed dubious techniques of
parameter estimation and causal inference, and
others are ambiguous about the way the final
causal structures are derived.20
Hibbs also notes that analyses are often confined to limited
subsamples of the potential data universe and that the use
of a single measure of underdevelopment (as represented in
Flannigan and Fogelman's study)

is inappropriate.

Concurring with Hibbs complaint is Leon Hurwitz, who,
article,

in his

"Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability,"

maintains the relationship between underdevelopment and
violence is too complex to permit the use of a single aspect
of underdevelopment to be exclusively employed to explain
the incidence of violence.21
Hurwitz would probably defend the approach taken by the
Schneiders and Gurr, but not Flannigan and Fogelman.
Flannigan and Fogelman's use of a single measure of
underdevelopment
agriculture)

(percentage of work force engaged in

to explain the occurrence of violence is overly

simplistic because violence is generally believed to occur
in response to a combination of many types of
underdevelopment.

Although a single-dimensional measure of

underdevelopment can usually be quantified,

it does not
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satisfy the theoretical requirement which recognizes many
causes of violence.
A measure that does satisfy this requirement is the
composite measure.

Using a composite measure of

underdevelopment is "intuitively more acceptable" because it
incorporates many more social conditions which are thought
to be linked to violence.

However, when using a composite

measure one must forego precise measurement because many
social attributes do not easily lend themselves to
mathematical indicators.

Faced with a choice between the

precision of a single-dimensional measure and the strong
theoretical basis of a composite measure, Hurwitz contends
that the suitable approach is the use of the composite
measure of underdevelopment.

Even though this method is not

responsive to precise quantification,

"it does not mean that

the approach is without merit, however,

for it rightfully

recognizes that the concept of stability cannot be reduced
to isolated variables."22
This investigation of the literature on cross
national causal analysis uncovered a number of issues
concerning the nature of instability, violence, and
underdevelopment.

Perhaps the most apparent is the

divergence of theories regarding the causes of violence.
Whereas one study demonstrated economic underdevelopment is
the leading cause of violence and instability others argued
that it was social mobilization and relative deprivation.
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A second issue is the debate over the use of single and
composite measures of underdevelopment.

An analysis of the

relationship between underdevelopment and violence which
employs a single-dimensional measure of underdevelopment to
explain the absence or abundance of violence,

such as

Flannigan and Fogelman's use of percentage of work force
engaged in agriculture,

is usually accurate in that it

generates a high degree of confidence in the statistical
correlations.

Nevertheless, this method cannot be

considered theoretically valid due to the consensus that
violence and instability result from a number of complex
interacting types of underdevelopment— economic, political
and social. Although the use of a composite measure of
underdevelopment,

like the Schneiders and Gurr study,

theoretically valid,

is

it is not statistically accurate.

Due

to the inherent imprecision in quantifying many social
conditions,
deprivation,

such as democracy,

institutionalization, and

a lower level of confidence results in the

statistical correlation between a composite measure of
underdevelopment and violence.

This problem is illustrated

by the fact that as more social conditions are included in
the measure of underdevelopment,

the less certain

(statistically) we become of its relationship to violence.
An examination of the definitions of democracy depicts this
problem by showing the difficulty in quantifying this
important social condition.
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According to H.B. Mayo, there are so many special and
personal meanings attached to the word democracy that it is
difficult to arrive at a operational definition.

In

attempting to set the record straight, Mayo defines
democracy as
. . . a political system in which public
policies are made on a majority basis by
representatives subject to effective popular
control at periodic elections which are
conducted on the principle of political
equality and under conditions of political
freedom.23
Although other authors seem to support this definition,
there remains,

as Mayo points out, substantial differences.

For example, Giovanni Sartori,

in his article "What

Democracy is Not," defines democracy as a condition where
"no one can choose himself or invest himself with
unconditional or unlimited power to rule."24

Another

definition by Dorothy Pickles notes that genuine democratic
governments must involve dialogue between different strands
of opinion, particularly between supporters and opponents of
the political system.25
These differing interpretations of democracy
demonstrate the problems facing attempts to discover a
statistical relationship between democracy and political
violence.

In addition to the absence of a generally

accepted definition of the concept,
exist with quantifying the word.

inherent difficulties

For example, economic

underdevelopment can easily be represented numerically as
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percentage of work force engaged in agriculture or the
number of unemployed, the balance of trade deficit,
recession, or as inflation.

However, the "principle of

political equality," or the "dialogue between differing
strands of opinion," cannot be represented numerically or
consistently from one author to another.
Despite the absence of the treatment of communism in
the discussion of the causes of instability and violence, a
partial assessment of the theory of underdevelopment and
violence can be made.
of violence,

Based on the analyses of the origins

it cannot be stated with certainly that

economic, political,

and social underdevelopment cause

instability and violence.

Nevertheless,

it is generally

accepted that instability and violence result from a myriad
of social conditions which have thus far eluded attempts to
illustrate their specific relationships to instability and
violence.

As a result, the theory of underdevelopment and

violence can be considered theoretically valid yet
statistically inaccurate.

Because of the inability to

specify the relationship among the various social conditions
and their impact upon instability and violence,

it is

impossible to identify which type of underdevelopment is
more likely to spark violence or to know if all three types
of underdevelopment are to blame.
In conclusion, the relationships proposed by the theory
of underdevelopment and violence would seem, based on these
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interpretations, not to provide a foundation for policy.
Without knowing the type and magnitude of underdevelopment
that will cause violence, policymakers cannot establish a
cause and effect relationship that will allow them to
develop plans of action with definite goals.

For example,

if it were true that a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would
bring about a corresponding drop in violence, then
policymakers could then set their goal at a 2.5 percent
increase in GNP.

However, without knowledge of the true

relationships between conditions of underdevelopment and
violence the goal of a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would be
meaningless.

Therefore, the theory of underdevelopment and

violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge
except for the very general idea that various kinds of
underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the
occurrence of violence.
The following chapter will examine the theory of
underdevelopment and violence by looking at its practical
application during the Alliance for Progress.
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CHAPTER III

The conclusions drawn from the review of the literature
on cross-national causal analysis indicated that the theory
of underdevelopment and violence is theoretically valid yet
statistically inaccurate.
inaccuracy,

Because of its statistical

questions remain as to whether certain

relationships proposed by the theory truly exist.

This

chapter will attempt to appraise the success of the theory
of underdevelopment and violence by observing its
application as the basis of U.S.

foreign policy during the

Alliance for Progress.
This evaluation of the theory in the context of the
Alliance for Progress depends on the perspective one adopts
toward the Alliance itself.

The three perspectives on the

Alliance outlined by Abraham F. Lowenthal form the core of
this examination.1
inspiration,
differently.

Each of the three perspectives views the

implementation,

and outcome of the Alliance

While the "liberal" perspective follows an

historical development of U.S. policy, the "radical"
perspective examines the nature of U.S.-Latin American
relations,

and the "bureaucratic" perspective focuses on the

foreign policy process as a key to understanding the
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Alliance.

PART I : THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

Liberal theory, according to Lowenthal, assumes that a
shared interest in hemispheric development exists between
the United States and Latin America, and that past
imperialistic policies such as "Gunboat" or "Dollar
Diplomacy" are non-recurrent.2

President Franklin D.

Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy is cited as pioneering
this relationship.

According to Lloyd Mecham,

in A Survey

of Untied States Latin America Relations:
This new policy meant that [United States]
interposition to protect private property might
not be undertaken if it clashed with broader
national policies.
American citizens could no
longer accept as a matter of course that they
had the right to call for the troops or
diplomatic interposition whenever or whatever
danger appeared.*5
Although military options waned, the U.S.

"continued to

employ the customary methods of diplomacy," such as
financial inducements, protests, and economic measures "to
create positive collaboration among the American states."4
However,

liberals conclude that Washington's reluctance to

"send in the Marines" clearly signaled that the link between
military protection of U.S.

investments and national

security was broken.5
Whatever goals Roosevelt had in mind for Latin America
were overshadowed at the end of World War II? Europe and the
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Marshall Plan dominated North American foreign policy.6
Liberals agree that Washington's strategic concerns in the
early postwar period focused primarily on Soviet
confrontation in Europe and containment in Korea, and paid
insufficient attention to Latin American problems and
issues.

As Washington turned its attention to the cold war,

"Latin Americans watched with growing resentment the
outpouring of U.S. assistance to Europe and Asia while their
own requests for assistance were being rejected."^
It was not until the late 1950s that Latin America once
again became the focus of U.S. attention.

The angry mobs

that greeted Richard Nixon on his tour of Latin America in
1958 and Castro's success in Cuba brought to the forefront
of U.S. awareness growing anti-Americanism,
underdevelopment,

communism,

and the resulting threat to U.S. security

in the hemisphere.
In an attempt to address the mounting crisis in Latin
America,

the Alliance for Progress was conceived, according

to the liberal perspective, as a "genuine U.S. government
commitment to cooperate with Latin American countries."8
Whereas U.S.

interests were obvious considerations,

it was

believed that Washington's concerns were also compatible
with,

and largely dependent upon,

progress in Latin America.9

social and economic

Furthermore,

liberal writers

maintain that "the Alliance represented a democratic
alternative to Cuba's revolutionary socialist formula for
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development."10

Linking the conditions of economic,

political, and social underdevelopment with increased
instability and unrest, Washington suddenly became aware
that "the spread of communism to the Western Hemisphere, a
possibility long feared by the United States, had become a
reality."11

What Washington hoped for was that the Alliance

would enable politically moderate elements to bring about
economic development and fundamental social change within
the framework of representative political institutions and
thus preempt the revolutionary forces of the left.12
Liberal accounts of the Alliance's performance differ,
but all seem to agree that U.S. actions,
benevolent,

initially

succumbed to unfortunate occurrences, were

handicapped by uncontrollable forces, and lacked necessary
understanding of Latin American politics.

Other reasons for

its lack of success include the death of it most ardent
supporter, John F. Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso's replacement as
Alliance coordinator and half-hearted implementation.
Finally, North Americans' penchant for quick results led
Washington officials to seek an immediate political impact
of a long-term program.
George C. Lodge,

in his book Engines of Change,

observed that a major stumbling block to creating a truly
multilateral program was United States dominance.

What was

originally designed to be an inter-American program of
mutual coordination and implementation, became by "default"
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a program of bilateral rather than multilateral relations.
Failure can also be attributed to Washington's belief that
Latin American governments had the will and capacity to
enact the sweeping economic, political,

and social reforms

envisioned by the Alliance's founders.

The truth was that

many governments were restricted on both accounts.

As Lodge

notes:
This restriction derives from two
characteristics of such societies:
A majority
of the people exist outside any significant
relationship to the government, beyond
jurisdiction, reach or interest; and government
tends to be the creature of oligarchic powerholders whose controlling interest is in
maintaining the status quo.13
The list of failures and problems identified by the
liberal writers is extensive.

One that merits further

investigation is the role of Latin America's middle class.
Lowenthal proposes that liberal writers, along with the
founders of the Alliance, assumed that conditions and
developments in Latin America had led to the beginnings of a
politically important middle class.
conception of the Alliance,

At the time of the

there was a growing belief among

U.S. policymakers that the swelling middle class of Latin
America would someday replace the traditional oligarchic
ruling process by one of debate and compromise among
conflicting interest groups not unlike the United States
political process.14
concluded,
predicted.

However,

as many liberal writers

the middle class did not evolve or act as
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Considered a great influence during the Alliance's
beginnings is John J. Johnson's book, Political Change in
Latin America: The Growth of The Middle Sectors.

Johnson

argued that Latin America's middle class economic,
political,

and social strength would grow rather than

decline in the decade of the 1960s and that the art of
compromise, unknown or disaffected in the past, has been
elevated to a new level which asserts to balance political
antagonisms.15

Identified as "stabilizers" or

"harmonizers," the middle class was considered the very
force which would ensure the success of the Alliance.

Due

to its non-homogeneous structure, the middle class
represented a modernizing element, according to Johnson,
devoted to a wide range of aims such as public education,
industrialization,

economic growth, and social welfare.16

With its roots firmly planted in industrialization and
urbanization,

the middle class was judged committed to

maintaining open avenues for socio-economic mobility.

As

these opportunities are unlocked and used, more individuals
are assimilated into the middle class structure of society
and as a result, come to perpetuate and expand these
approaches of mobility and thus the impetus of that
mobility— industrialization.17
In their pursuit of economic, political,
equality,

and social

the middle class comes into conflict with the

"patronage" system of the ruling elite.

The ensuing
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struggle finds the middle class allied with the lower class
and even "advocating the admission of these classes to the
body politic and their more active participation in the
social and economic advantages."18

Rather than a marriage

of convenience, the two groups subscribe to the goal of an
open society with enforced standards of equal participation.
The needs of the middle class require an alliance with the
lower classes to face the traditional elite and to maintain
or increase avenues for their own mobility and in turn the
lower classes,

"thus making it a willing instrument in the

transformation of social and economic institutions."19
In Louis Ratinoff's work, The New Urban Groups: The
Middle Classes. Johnson's theory is cited as the
theory .
rival.

customary

The alternate view contrasts sharply with its

Basic to this approach is the assumption that the

middle class,

"in some circumstances,

represents a force

committed to maintaining the traditional social system."20
Although there are means for economic, political, and social
mobility, they are restricted by norms imposed by the
traditional elite.
patronage

This is characterized as a system of

rather than

merit .

Newly arriving middle

class individuals become socialized by the traditional norms
of patronage and ultimately come to perpetuate them.

As for

the middle class's aspirations for maintaining open avenues
of mobility and allying themselves with the lower classes,
Ratinoff notes that it is

. . . dependent upon the system's ability
to satisfy the middle classes' minimum
aspirations.
If the system provides a
reasonable degree of satisfaction for such
aspirations, the middle classes tend to model
their behavior and standards on those of the
traditional social elite.21
If the system does not provide these minimum requirements,
the middle class collides with the traditional elite "often
embracing populist ideologies built on social justice and a
sense of freedom."22

However, the reality in Latin America

indicated that although "the middle class,
power,

in their rise to

introduce all kinds on innovations, they did not

commit themselves to the establishment of social order based
on middle class values."23

Ratinoff concludes:

Middle class policies simply preserved the
established positions and recognized poverty as
a fact of the social system.
The impulse
toward a better distribution of power,
prestige, and wealth steadily declined in
importance, and the middle sectors showed more
interest in securing for themselves the
advantages of the desired status, in a social
organization where the presence of poverty has
heightened the privileges of the groups in
power.24
Concurring with this line of thought is Victor Alba,
who in his book Alliance Without Alli e s , discredits the idea
that the middle class of Latin America was a modernizing
force dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.
In examining the "myth" of the middle class desire for
economic, political,

and social advancement, Alba concludes

that the middle class rejected change and thus served only
to satisfy their own needs and those of the traditional
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ruling elite.25
In another analysis of the middle class of Latin
America, Jo£e Nun set out to dispel the popular belief that
the military was primarily a tool of the oligarchy used to
suppress the desires of the middle and lower classes.

Nun

proposes that the Latin American military, because of its
predominantly middle class make up, more often comes to the
defense of the middle class who are committed to maintaining
their position in society.

According to Nun, most military

officers come from urban middle class backgrounds which form
the basis of much of the military's political convictions.25
These opinions on the economic, political,

and social

direction of the country manifest themselves when
confrontation appears between the lower class

desire for

reform and the elite's desire to maintain the status quo.
Reacting out of fear that the confrontation may push the
oligarchy towards repression and the lower classes toward
revolution,

the middle class relies on the armed forces to

keep either group from going too far.27
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the liberal
perspective of the Alliance for Progress.
most important is that,

But perhaps the

if the liberal perspective is

correct, policymakers lacked a clear understanding of the
socio-political dynamics of Latin American societies.

The

architects of the Alliance believed that the growing middle
class of Latin America,

like their counterparts in the
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United States, were devoted to economic prosperity,
equality, and political democratization.
conditions,

social

These very same

if nurtured and allowed to flourish, would bring

about enhanced security for the U.S. by diminishing
instability, violence, and the threat of communist
encroachment in Latin America.

Nevertheless, experience

illustrated that these middle class groups did not act as
predicted and in many cases helped to perpetuate the
continuing cycle of underdevelopment and violence.
In conclusion, the application of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for
progress,

according to the liberal perspective, was a

failure due to the incorrect assumption that the middle
class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry
out development programs.
Although the theory of underdevelopment and violence,
as it was illustrated in chapter one of this paper, did not
discuss the role of Latin America's middle class, the
theory's call for economic liberalization, political
democratization,

and social reform certainly reflects middle

class values and desires.

This point is illuminated by

liberal writers who indicated that policymakers during the
Alliance believed Latin America's middle class was evolving
much like the middle class in the United States.
Therefore,

from this assumption,

it seems evident that

the theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived
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and implemented exclusively from the perspective of U.S.
middle class values and desires— not Latin American.

The

cause of the Alliance's problems may be attributed to the
attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the completely
different middle class values in Latin America.

As a

result, the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of
underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for
Progress resulted not as much from the assumption that
underdevelopment caused violence, but that the remedy for
overcoming violence through the extension of development
assistance, which reflected U.S. middle class values, would
not apply in countries that had completely different middle
class values.
The liberal perspective provides one viewpoint for
assessing the Alliance for Progress and the theory of
underdevelopment and violence.

The following section will

examine an alternative approach called the radical
perspective.

PART II:

THE RADICAL PERSPECTIVE

The "radical" perspective characteristically includes
one theme: United States foreign policies serve primarily
the expansive interests of North American capitalism.
liberals regard as a compatibility of interests,

What

radicals

see as a conflict between the United States' urge to
dominate and Latin Americas' desire to be sovereign.
business dictates policy, and Washington,

Big

always eager to

support these interests, accommodates businesses through its
foreign policy.
The radical perspective represents an amalgamation of
theories grounded on Marxist-Leninist analysis of
capitalism,

dependency, modes of production,

and revolution.
U.S.

imperialism,

A common perception among radicals is that

suspicion and fear of Latin America is generated by the

perceived threat of communism,

nationalism,

and revolution

to U.S. corporate and strategic concerns.
Rejecting the notion that U.S.

imperialism occurred

only during overt military intervention,
suggests,

as liberal theory

the radical perspective views imperialism as a

"multi-dimensional concept" whose components are in
persistent interplay.

James Petras notes,
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in his book
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Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, that to
consider imperialism solely in economic or military terms is
nonsense.
contact.

Imperialism is carried out through all levels of
"Even voluntary student and intellectual

associations are used by the U.S. government to transmit
values among the educated classes of the third world to
facilitate the acceptance of U.S. economic penetration.m1
While liberals regarded the Good Neighbor policy as an
improvement in U.S.-Latin American relations,

radicals see

it as a continuation of U.S. dominance of Latin America.
David Green's analysis of the Good Neighbor policy,

in The

Containment of Latin America, suggests that U.S. policy was
based on containing Latin American nationalism because of
its threat to U.S. business and strategic concerns.2

For

example, Green argues that the 1938 expropriation of U.S.
oil interests by Mexico would have prompted considerable
effort by United States policymakers to head off the spread
of nationalism in Latin America if not for the advent of
World War II.3
A dominant radical characterization of the nature of
U.S.-Latin American relations draws from dependency theory.
According to Dale Johnson,

in his article "Dependency and

The International System," dependency occurs when one or
more countries' economies are "conditioned" by the expansion
of another dominant country.

This relationship assumes

dependency when the dependent country can develop

(economically)

only as a reflection of the dominant

country's economic expansion.

Linked in part to Latin

America's colonial experience, dependency encompasses
reliance upon one or two exports
agriculture),

(usually cash-crop

need for foreign capital, and foreign

ownership of important economic sectors.

Johnson concludes

that this relationship results from and is perpetuated by
the imperatives generated in the structure and functioning
of the U.S. economic system.4
Radicals argue that one of the many components of
dependency,

foreign investment, has been integrated into

vital sectors of Latin America economies
services,

agriculture,

(industry,

and consumer goods)

at such an

alarming rate that it has come to determine and influence
many countries' manner of economic development.
to Teotonio dos Santos,

According

in his article "The Changing

Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin America," the roots
of this present crisis can be traced back to
industrialization.

Because of insufficient domestic capital

and investment needed to sustain economic development,
America turned toward foreign money.

Latin

As foreign investment

began to switch from the "colonial exporting enclave"
(agriculture and mining)

to the manufacturing sector, more

corporations became "affiliated" with North America and
European firms,

allowed secured monopolies over key markets,

and thus furthered dependence on foreign imports and created
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a financial dependence on much needed foreign capital.5
Santos concludes that "there is growing contradiction
between the control exercised by foreign capital over the
economy and the technical capacity of the [Latin American]
economy to support itself."6
Latin America's response to these conditions was mixed.
In many countries the backlash of anti-Americanism generated
by the policies of multinationals and the U.S. government
has led to expropriation and nationalization of U.S.
businesses,

as well as attempts to break away from reliance

on U.S. manufactured and imported products.
conditions of import substitution,

Even under

in which countries

establish industries designed to compete with and eventually
overtake foreign imported goods, Latin America still must
rely on the importation of raw materials,
parts,

intermediate

and the machinery and equipment necessary to

establish production.7

Compounding Latin America's

difficulties is the lack of export markets,

a condition

often attributed to the barriers imposed by developed
countries to protect their own businesses.
America,

concludes Dale Johnson,

In Latin

"there is little

expectation that significant markets can be found for
exports of manufactured products that might loosen
dependence upon primary exports."6
The radical view of the Alliance for Progress follow
from their use of dependency theory.

What liberal accounts
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describe as a genuine program of economic,

social, and

political development, radicals see a "sophisticated
instrument" to advance U.S. private economic interests.
Characterized as a program for the protection of
investments, earnings, and new profit making opportunities,
radicals argue that the Alliance "amounted in short to a
government administered welfare program for U.S.
investors."9
To the radical view, the rhetoric surrounding the
Alliance for Progress was just that, rhetoric.

Reforms and

other goals proclaimed by the Alliance "fundamentally
conflicted with U.S. corporate interests and the U.S.
corporate system in Latin America."10

David Horowitz,

in

his book Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of
Contemporary Hi s t o r y , comments that Washington "openly
abandoned" the idea of encouraging development in Latin
America.

Instead,

it became an "imperial guardian of a

prototype neo-colonial system" in which its instrument of
subjugation was the Alliance for Progress.11
With a similar interpretation, Simon Hanson,

in his

book Dollar Diplomacy Modern S t vle. suggests that the
Alliance marked the revival of an old policy.

Hanson

theorizes that "during the decade of the Alliance for
Progress dollar diplomacy was revived with a scope that
dwarfed the earlier episodes."1^
U.S.

It was a "new era" where

interests and property were protected by intervention
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so great that "the American Ambassador had indeed become not
the second most important man, but actually the most
important man in the country, the man to see, as far as
public policy goes."13

Also termed "welfare diplomacy," the

Alliance represented a pursuit of U.S.

interests in which

the primary instrument of policy was money, and the central
tenet of policy was that money could solve any problem.14
According to this line of reasoning, the Alliance
worked on two fronts.

First,

it represented a subsidy for

U.S. overseas investments, and second,

it used economic

assistance to pressure and influence Latin American
governments.

In the case of influence turned outright

threat of sanction, Hanson points to U.S. dealings with
Argentina.

It was speculated that Argentina was influenced,

during the early years of the Alliance,
deals with U.S. oil companies.

into making bad

Inevitably Argentine

reaction was unfavorable to what Hanson describes as
"foisted" business deals.

The outpouring of Argentine

support to renege on the contracts forced a U.S. response.
Hanson recalls that
The White House rushed in to warn Argentina
that anything done to [change the]
relationships with the oil companies...would
meet instant reprisal in terms of aid from the
United States.1*
The short and long-term benefits of the Alliance were
limited to a few corporations.
the U.S. taxpayer.

The cost fell directly on

Eliminating investment risks by shifting
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those risks to the taxpayer was central to the Alliance.
The U.S. citizen was unaware that "the evacuation of
unprofitable investments by private corporations was an
objective of the Alliance."16

While liberals believed that

a separation of national and private interests had been
achieved, Hanson proposes that "the corporate interest would
be attached to the national interest, and in a choice given
priority over the national interest."17
was designed to benefit U.S.
corporate interests,

Though the Alliance

interests by promoting

it failed to do so.

Hanson concludes:

What happened in the decade of the Alliance
was that U.S. bureaucrats had come to
realize, if not admit, that the thesis of
dollar diplomacy modern style had proven to
be a failure.
It was impossible to install
democratic governments by selective
donations.
It was impossible to defend
private investments by selective allocations
of donations and indeed the device had
proved counter-productive by providing an
alternative to provision of a suitable
climate of investment.18
As a result, the Alliance could no longer be justified to
the American public.

According to Hanson,

its fruitless

drain on the U.S. taxpayer could not be concealed in light
of the lack of progress.

By 1970 the Alliance died quietly,

its programs and what little funds were available where
transferred to other inter-American agencies.
The radical's analysis of the success of the Alliance
for Progress rests upon the supposition that the very nature
of U.S.

involvement in Latin America is exploitive.

In the

radical view the Alliance for Progress was never intended to
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benefit Latin America.
foreign investors.

Its purpose was to subsidize U.S.

Its aim also included protecting U.S.

overseas businesses by withholding or releasing Alliance
funds to Latin American governments.
In conclusion, the radical perspective represents the
view that U.S.

interests, however cleverly disguised,

are

not reflected by the theory of underdevelopment and violence
as it was explained in chapter one of this paper or by the
liberal perspective's account of the Alliance for Progress.
However,

if we overlook the radical assumption that U.S.

policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S.
businesses,

insight can be gained as to the viability of the

theory of underdevelopment and violence.
Considering that U.S. business interests are not
necessarily paramount to U.S.

foreign policy, but do

represent an important force, the value of the radical view
emerges in its recognition that these interests did not
coincide with the theory behind the Alliance.

Whether at

its outset or somewhere in the process, business interests
were clearly important considerations during the Alliance
for Progress.

What the radical perspective provides is the

recognition that U.S.

foreign policy is affected by business

interests and that these interests are not necessarily
devoted to economic, political,

and social development in

Latin America.
The following section examines the "bureaucratic11
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perspective.

The bureaucratic analysis focuses on the

foreign policy process.

This view provides further evidence

that interests, other than those loyal to economic,
political,

and social development in Latin America, can

manipulate policy to their own views.

PART III:

THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE

Unlike the liberal and radical perspectives,

the

"bureaucratic" perspective analyzes foreign policy by
determining the roles of the participants and their effect
on the creation and implementation of policy.
bureaucratic perspective,
policy,

foreign policy,

To the

like domestic

represents the culmination of efforts of individuals

and organizations,

inside and outside government, to express

their interests and have them incorporated in policy
choices.

The interaction of these participants entails a

"series of overlapping and inter-locking bargaining
processes."1

Therefore, knowledge of the interworkings of

this process— who the players were, what their concerns and
roles were, and where the interaction was located— will lead
to a better understanding of the outcome of U.S.

foreign

policy.
The pioneer of this approach, Graham T. Allison,
rejected the traditional single actor model as a
comprehensive approach to the study of U.S.

foreign policy

in favor of the organizational and bargaining models.
Allison suggests that treating governments as purposive
individuals obscures the influence of others.
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According to
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Allison,

"the maker of government policy is not one

calculating individual but rather a conglomerate of large
organizations and political actors.1'2
Due to the United States' expanded role in world
affairs after World War II, numerous organizations and
individuals began, and succeeded in, challenging the State
Department's monopoly in foreign affairs.3

As a result,

various interests came to exert influence in the formation
and execution of U.S.

foreign policy.

Even within the

government itself, countless agencies labored to ensure that
their views and interests were represented.
Next to the executive branch, the most visibly
influential organization within government is Congress.
With its constitutionally vested powers,
appropriation of funds,

such as

ratification of treaties, and

limited control over the use of the military,

Congress

naturally inspires the formation and execution of foreign
policy.4

However, there are government organizations that

possess equally effective powers to influence the direction
of U.S.

foreign policy.

The agencies and departments of what is referred to as
the intelligence community are charged with collection,
analysis,

and dissemination of critical knowledge that forms

the basis of most foreign policy decisions.

The opportunity

to weight and bias this information is clearly present but,
as Allison points out, this may not be the case due to a
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central characteristic.

Like most government bureaucracies,

the intelligence community "functions less as integral parts
of a unitary head that entertains preconceptions and
theories than as organs that perform their tasks in a
habitual fashion."5

Although an established routine

furnishes guidelines that allows agencies and departments to
function in a coherent fashion,

it can also inhibit the

(

execution of policy once those guidelines are by-passed.
For example, when organizations are confronted with a
foreign policy that is not completely understood or lacks
clearly defined procedures,

"their performance is likely to

appear sluggish and inappropriate to external critics,

and

their patterns of behavior are likely to seem encrusted and
incapable of change to outsiders."6
Another characteristic of governmental organizations is
a will to maintain some measure of independent action and to
expand its area of responsibility.7

In this respect,

organizations are both imperialistic and self-serving.
maintain their semi-sovereignty,

To

agencies and departments

must justify appropriation requests while fending off
attempts to reduce their budget.

Consequently,

competition

arises among organizations over the inability to define
organizational jurisdiction of many tasks, which usually
results in one agency being pitted against another over the
responsibility of doing a job.
policy?

How does this affect foreign

A clear example provided by Graham Allison recounts

67
the ten day delay in getting U-2 reconnaissance photos of
Cuban missile bases to President Kennedy because of a
jurisdictional dispute between the Air Force and the CIA
over who would conduct the U-2 mission.8
Foreign policies regularly affect private
organizations.

They,

in turn, try to ensure that policies

are favorable by "bringing a wide variety of aims and
perspectives to bear with differing degrees of effectiveness
at various points in the policy-making process."9

An

example of this would be the effects of both domestic and
international business organizations.

At times businesses

within the United States have attempted to persuade the
government to restrict, through tariffs for example, a
foreign competitor;

international businesses may attempt to

convince the government to protect their overseas holdings
and investments from expropriation,
burdensome taxes.

nationalization,

and

In this sense foreign policies can

reflect an organization's need for government cooperation
and also how effectively organizations tie their interests
to national politics.

However,

the U.S. government often

requires the cooperation of these same organizations in
order to implement foreign policy.

An extreme example would

be economic boycott or disinvestment,

another more subtle

from would be the promotion, through tax incentives, of
private investment in foreign countries to augment the U.S.
government's foreign economic policies.

In the case of the
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Alliance and the Commission Report, both called for
increased private investment to aid economic development in
Latin America.

As the business-government relationship

becomes apparent,

it is evident that business interests

often fulfill important roles in the creation and
implementation of U.S.

foreign policy.

Individuals also may be important actors in U.S.
foreign policy.

Those who seem to exert the most influence

are usually leaders of organizations inside and outside the
government.

Clearly,

financial and political strength is

decisive but equally important is how a leader's personal
traits— honesty,
by others.

integrity, and credibility— are perceived

Congressmen, religious leaders, business

executives and agency directors,

for example, work to shape

and mold government behavior through a series of
games .10

bargaining

These individuals seek to promote their interests

which are molded by their perceptions of national security,
their organization,

and their domestic and personal

concerns.
Because the bureaucratic perspective focuses on the
creation and implementation of policy, an analysis of the
Alliance for Progress must begin with an investigation of
the individuals responsible for its creation.

The

architects of the Alliance were principally scholars and
Latin America specialists eager to employ the comprehensive
plans of the Kennedy administration.

According to
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Lowenthal,

they were attentive to Latin American views, and

committed to inter-American cooperation.12

Latin American

specialists Douglas Dillon and R. R. Rubottum directed much
of the negotiating and fact finding for the Alliance.13
Dillon was U.S. representative at the signing of the
Alliance Charter,

at Punta del Este, and was later

criticized for committing the U.S. to a multimillion dollar
program without Congressional approval.
assistant Adolf Berle,

Presidential

"the man who provided the link

between the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for
Progress," was also responsible for Latin American and
Caribbean leaders' access to Kennedy in the policy formation
process.14

The Latin American Task Force, which provided

the foundation of the Alliance, consisted of Berle, Teodoro
Moscoso, Morales Carrion, Robert Goodwin, and three U.S.
professors

(Lincoln Gordon, Robert Alexander, and Arthur

Wh itacker).

The engineers of the Alliance were a small

inner circle of Latin American specialists mainly from
academia; they were not dominated by business interests.
the contrary, most of Kennedy's appointments reflected the
exclusion of many traditional foreign policy players, the
business community among them.
appointments,

Of Kennedy's first 200

6 percent were from business and 18 percent

from universities,

compared to 36 percent and 6 percent

respectively during the Eisenhower administration.15
In addition to the exclusion of many traditional

On
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participants from the policy formation process, the crisis
tone of the administration's appraisal of Latin America
further confined the creation of policy to a small group.
This feeling of urgency in the Kennedy administration's
arguments for Latin American assistance was recorded by
Arthur Schlesinger.

According to Schlesinger "the old order

in Latin America was breaking up.

There was no longer any

question of preserving the status quo."18
Writers who assume the bureaucratic perspective argue
that the administration presented the Alliance as a certain
cure for an inevitable crisis.

Just as a domestic crisis

mobilizes public, congressional, and bureaucratic support
for the President, the same can be said of foreign policy.
Stanley Hoffman,

in Gulliver's Travels,

or the Setting of

American Foreign P olicy, argues that the policy making
process is "normally" an ordeal with infighting reaching
vast proportions.

However,

"a crisis abroad acts like a

truce at home and makes it easier to restrict policymaking
to a small inner circle."17

Although crisis decisions often

lead to improvised and abrupt resolutions based on unsteady
compromises resulting in short-term rather than long-term
solutions, when disaster is imminent, remarks Hoffman,
"there may not be time to integrate the different services
and their varying frames of analysis before acting."18
While the formation of the Alliance for Progress
appeared to be restricted to a small group,

it clearly
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became evident that its implementation would not.

The

groups and individuals assigned to administer the Alliance
programs were probably the first to regain some measure of
influence over its direction.

Christopher Mitchell,

in

"Dominance and Fragmentation of U.S Latin American Policy,"
portrays the reintroduction of these groups as the outcome
of a Presidential resolve inadequate to withstand the
fragmentary political pressures.

As a result,

military men, and private pressure groups,

"diplomats,

(especially

investors and exporters), all pressured for and regained
considerable margin for independent action."1^

Concurring

with this appraisal, Robert Wagner commented that the
process by which Latin American policies were implemented
during the Alliance,

"seems to have been characterized by

the same fragmentation of power and difficulty of achieving
a set of political goals insulated from the demands of
private pressure groups that characterize the rest of
American politics."2^

Two groups, whose influence grew

during the Alliance— private businesses and governmental
organizations— had a substantial impact upon the execution
of policy.
The Alliance lasted ten years, and drew a myriad
competitors into the policy process.

They could be observed

each year as the Alliance budget request came before
Congress.

The Congress made certain that interests outside

those responsible for the initial creation of the Alliance
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had at least a chance to air their views.21

Although

briefly mentioned in the Charter of Punta del Este, and
seemingly left out of the policy formation process,
businesses became influential in the implementation of the
Alliance's programs.22

The Inter-American Development Bank,

along with other international and domestic lending
institutions, private investors and international
corporations,

not only joined government efforts to

revitalize Latin American economies, but made certain their
views and interests were represented.23
An example of their impact was the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, which
according to Levinson and DeOnis,

"marked the reintroduction

of business interests in foreign policy and effectively tied
the foreign assistance programs of the Alliance to the
protection of overseas investment."24

The amendment

compelled the President to suspend economic aid to any
country that expropriated the property of a U.S. company,
repudiated a contract with a U.S. company, or made a U.S.
company subject to discriminatory taxation or
administration.2 5
Another illustration of the influence business was able
to wield emerged from a dispute between the government of
Peru and the International Petroleum Company

(IPC).

Nationalistic pressures within Peru prompted an attempt to
nationalize the country's oil deposits which were owned by
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IPC— a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Washington's response was a temporary freeze,

(lasting

almost two years), on assistance to Peru— an indication that
Washington was strongly influenced by IPC and Standard Oil
of New Jersey.26

A further demonstration of Standard Oil's

leverage was the apparent disregard to include the State
Department in negotiations between IPC and Peru.27
In addition to businesses, various agencies and
departments which were initially left out of the creation of
the Alliance, but charged with administering its assistance
programs, were able to alter policy greatly.
particular,

One agency in

the Agency for International Development

(AID),

which processed loan applications, engineered development
programs,

and finally audited those programs, had a great

influence on policy.
The procedures which AID established to distribute
assistance often became a hinderance to the smooth operation
of the Alliance.

Compounding the complex and cumbersome

array of guidelines for filing loan applications was the
fact that many Latin American countries were ill-equipped to
submit detailed and comprehensive requests and unable to
distribute funds effectively.

As a result, AID's loan staff

officers would often encounter delays authorizing and
allocating assistance funds due to the obstacles of getting
Latin American foreign ministers to sign authorizations. The
delays were frequently ascribed to difficulty in translating
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important clauses, and lack of a full-time legal staff.28
Although administrative procedures could be refined and
improved, AID was besieged by interest groups, who, out of
fear of the growing leftist and communist influences in
Latin America, pressured for a re-defining of Alliance
goals.

AID field officers,

representing in-country Latin

American development and reform interests, and AID officials
in Washington,

representing lobbyists, Congressmen,

and

other agencies and departments, became embroiled in a
political battle over the direction of Alliance goals; the
AID field officers ultimately lost.2^

The outcome of this

reinterpretation of the Alliance's emphasis resulted in
adopting quick-fix anti-communist programs rather than long
term economic,

political,

and social reforms.

Washington AID representative,

Philip Golden, there were

three types of Latin American assistance,
priority,

hysterical,

According to

"very high

and if-we-don't-make-this-loan-the-

communists-will-take-over-the-country."30

The effect of

this strategy— attempting to counteract leftist influence—
led agencies such as AID to seek projects which would
eagerly be accepted by Latin American governments,
implemented rapidly, concretely obvious to the local people,
and decidedly short-term in nature.31
Riordan Roett's analysis of Alliance programs in
Northeast Brazil concluded that the emphasis on combating
leftist influences with short-term remedies rather than
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long-term economic, political, and social development
programs encouraged U.S. agencies to bypass local
development coalitions and become embroiled in political
infighting among state and national levels of Latin American
governments.

AID'S involvement with Brazil's

Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast
(SUDENE)

not only highlights the suspicions held by AID

officials of communist influences in local coalitions, but
the overall politicalization of Alliance efforts in
Brazil.32
Through the dedicated leadership of Celso Furtado and
the administrative ingenuity of SUDENE, an innovative plan
for economic, political, and social reform in Brazil's
Northeast region was formulated.

With Furtado's personal

reception by President Kennedy and the apparent support of
the plan by AID's Northeast Survey Team, the stage seemed
set for the implementation of Alliance programs.

However,

AID officials in Washington, believing that SUDENE had been
infiltrated by communist elements and its staff was
attempting to challenge the traditional political powerholders,

felt that SUDENE should be excluded from overseeing

the assistance program.33

Another reason for SUDENE's

diminished role was AID's desire to circumvent SUDENE's
perceived efforts to undermine the political power and
support for Governor Alves of the Brazilian state of Rio
Grande do Norte, who was being challenged by leftist
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elements and the development coalition organized by SUDENE.
Once given the go ahead by AID representatives in
Washington, Alves established his own development staff,
independent of SUDENE, to execute the program.

A further

hobbling of SUDENE's role came about when Brazilian
President Joao Goulart, needing Alves' political support,
allowed the program to proceed without SUDENE's approval or
supervision,
staff.

thereby delegating authority to AID and ALVES'

The results of this program allowed Alves to spurn

state development programs,

escape SUDENE supervision,

fortify his own political position, and release state funds,
that would have otherwise gone into a development program,
for Alves' political activities.34

Roett concludes that the

over-all impact of U.S. aid in Northeast Brazil counteracted
Brazil's modernization efforts in that area.35
In conclusion,

the bureaucratic perspective presents a

critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of
the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who
create,

influence,

and implement foreign policy.

Writers

who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the
Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional
setting were the normal foreign policy participants were
excluded.

Based on the crisis tone of the administration's

appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to
restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of
advisors,

those organizations and individuals responsible
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for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its
creation, but however, were able to gain considerable
influence over its direction once the programs were put into
ac t i o n .
Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the
direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the
Agency for International Development.

The successful

reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the
passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment.

The resurgence of

AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over
the desire to counter communist influence with short-term
highly visible programs rather than the more long-term
development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's
founders.
The influence of businesses relates to the belief that
the Alliance proposed greater Latin American economic
development and self-sufficiency.
perspective,

From a Latin American

the United States seemed prepared to relinquish

its control over national means of production— the oil
deposits in Peru,

for example.

However, what the creators

of the Alliance envisioned did not correspond to the desires
of those businesses which held interests in or controlled
the national production capabilities of Latin American
nations.

Once Latin American countries sought to gain

control of these foreign owned means of production, U.S.
businesses pressured for and were able to block many Latin
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American attempts to expropriate and nationalize U.S. held
business interests.
The influence of the Agency for International
Development can be traced to the determination that Latin
American societies faced immediate threat from communist
forces.

In response to this, AID was able to reorient the

thrust of Alliance programs away from long-term economic,
political,

and social reforms toward short-term highly

visible anti-communist programs.
The influence of AID was also linked to the belief that
Latin American governments must initiate democratic reforms.
The very basis of the Alliance itself— increasing the
participation and political influence of non-traditional
political players in the nation's economic, political,

and

social development— could not be balanced with the fact that
U.S. assistance was funneled through the very same political
forces that were committed to maintaining the traditional
political system.

In the Case of Brazil, AID's efforts to

initiate development plans and increase democratic political
participation,

threatened to diffuse the political power

base of the groups with which AID had to work to institute
these development plans.

As a result, Alliance efforts

became tethered to various political struggles between Latin
American power holders and newly emerging groups that the
Alliance was originally designed to bring about.
The bureaucratic perspective outlines one aspect of the
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Alliance for Progress which is useful in evaluating the
theory of underdevelopment and violence.
chapter which follows,

In the concluding

lessons learned from the three

perspectives of the Alliance for Progress as well as the
analysis of the theoretical foundations of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence will be gathered together in
order evaluate the theory's viability as a basis for United
States foreign policy.
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CONCLUSION

Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and
the success of its application during the Alliance for
Progress,

this thesis asks whether the theory of

underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation
for United States foreign policy.

The methods employed to

answer this question were utilized in three chapters.
Chapter one uncovered the concepts of the theory of
underdevelopment and violence.

Chapter two established the

validity and accuracy of the theory and chapter three
assessed, with the aid of three different perspectives,

the

success of its application during the Alliance for Progress.
As a result of this examination, a judgment can now be made
regarding the theory's viability as a basis for United
States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.
In chapter one,

four assumptions that form the theory

of underdevelopment and violence were uncovered by examining
the official documents and statements from the period of the
Alliance for Progress and the findings and recommendations
of the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central
America.

The first assumption indicates that economic,
89
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political,

and social underdevelopment lead

instability.

to violence and

It was believed that frustration over these

conditions caused people to react violently.

The second

assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause
the root conditions, economic, political, and social
underdevelopment,

to worsen.

This interrelationship can be

characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster
increased underdevelopment.

The third assumption theorizes

that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence,
and instability encourage
revolution.
violence,

communist subversion and

Finally, the fourth assumption argues that

instability, and communist encroachment can be

stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social
development.
In chapter two, the analysis of the theoretical
foundations of the theory of underdevelopment and violence
focused on three questions.

First, can it be stated with

certainty that economic, political, and social
underdevelopment cause
encroachment?

violence,

instability, and communist

Second, are all three conditions of

underdevelopment equally important or does economic
underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability?

And

third, do the relationships proposed by the theory of
underdevelopment and violence provide a foundation for
defined policies with specific objectives?

The conclusions
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illustrated that the relationships proposed by the theory of
underdevelopment and violence are uncertain, and thus do not
provide a sufficient foundation for policy.

Without knowing

the type and magnitude of underdevelopment that will cause
violence, policymakers cannot establish a cause and effect
relationship that will allow them to develop plans of action
with definite goals.

The theory of underdevelopment and

violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge
except for the very general idea that various kinds of
underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the
occurrence of violence.
In the third chapter, three perspectives,
radical,

the liberal,

and bureaucratic, were used to appraise the success

of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as it was
applied during the Alliance for Progress.
According to the liberal perspective,

the Alliance

failed because of the incorrect assumption that the middle
class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry
out development programs.
The theory of underdevelopment and violence was
conceived and implemented exclusively from the perspective
of U.S. middle class values and desires— not Latin American.
The cause of the Alliance's problems can be attributed to
the attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the
different middle class values in Latin America.
result,

As a

the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of
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underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for
Progress resulted not as much from the theory's assumptions,
but that the remedy for overcoming violence through the
extension of development assistance, which reflected U.S.
middle class values, would not apply in countries that had
completely different middle class values.
Unlike the liberal account of the Alliance for
Progress, the radical perspective rests upon the supposition
that the very nature of U.S.
exploitive.

involvement in Latin America is

According to radicals, the Alliance for

Progress was never intended to benefit Latin America.
purpose was to subsidize U.S.

foreign investors.

Its

Its aim

also included protecting U.S. overseas businesses by
withholding or releasing Alliance funds to Latin American
governments.
However,

if we overlook the radical assumption that

U.S. policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S.
businesses,

insight can be gained as to the success of the

Alliance for Progress.
Considering that U.S. business interests are not
necessarily paramount to U.S.

foreign policy, but do

represent an important force, the value of the radical view
emerges in its recognition that these interests did not
coincide with the theory of economic, political and social
development in Latin America.

Business interests were

clearly important considerations during the Alliance for
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Progress and did affect policy.

What the radical

perspective provides is the recognition that U.S.

foreign

policy is affected by business interests and that these
interests are not necessarily devoted to economic,
political,

and social development in Latin America.

Finally, the bureaucratic perspective presented a
critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of
the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who
create,

influence,

and implement foreign policy.

Writers

who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the
Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional
setting were the normal foreign policy participants were
excluded.

Based on the crisis tone of the administration's

appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to
restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of
advisors, those organizations and individuals responsible
for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its
creation, but however, were able to gain considerable
influence over its direction once the programs were put into
action.
Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the
direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the
Agency for International Development

(AID).

The successful

reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the
passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment.

The resurgence of

AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over
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the desire to counter communist influence with short-term
highly visible programs rather than the more long-term
development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's
founders.
In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and
violence,

in its present form, does not represent a viable

foundation for United States foreign policy in under
developed countries of the world.

The theory consists of an

unproven set of assumptions that do not establish a solid
foundation for foreign policy.

In addition, the application

of the theory during the Alliance demonstrated numerous
problems.

First, the theory is based on U.S. middle class

values and desires.

Its success is dependent upon the

acceptance of these values in societies were middle class
values are not the same.

Unless the theory can be modified

to reflect the values of the society to which it will be
applied,

it will likely encounter the same problems.

Second, business interests affect foreign policy and they do
not necessarily coincide with economic, political,
social development policies.
Alliance,

and

And third, during the

the theory of underdevelopment and violence was

conceived and implemented without the participation of many
traditional foreign policy actors.

Once those traditional

players were called upon to implement the Alliance,

they

were able to transform the program to suit their interests
and concerns.

Due to the nature of the U.S.

foreign policy

process,

it is likely that the theory of underdevelopment

and violence would be subjected to the same pressures if
were to be set in motion again.
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